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
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
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SUDAN: Prospects for agreement with southern re-
bels. (Page 8)



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SUDAN: President Numayri seems resolved to reach an accommodation with the southern rebels, but the provisional agreement signed this week will be difficult to implement.

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There are still considerable obstacles to a final resolution of the conflict. The first hurdle for both sides will be to overcome deep mutual distrust and to achieve broad support for the provisional agreement. This is a particularly complex problem for the Anya-Nya, whose leadership is fragmented and whose forces are dispersed throughout the wide expanse of the three southern provinces. One leading political dissident has already denounced the parley and claims that his views are shared by a number of Anya-Nya commanders in the field.

Numayri's main task is to sell the agreement to the army, whose support is critical to his staying in power. The pro-Egyptian faction in the military and within the government itself may object on the ground that an autonomous black southern region would further dilute Sudan's Arab identity.

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
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Another possible impediment is the still unknown attitude of the Israelis, whose arms deliveries and training in recent years have substantially strengthened the rebel forces.

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